When on June 2nd 1997 Thailand devalued its currency, the stage was set was the most severe and virulent currency crisis of that decade. The sudden reversal of capital flows depleted economic wealth and social cohesion in many East Asian countries, hitherto perveived to belong to the Asian Miracle. Shockwaves of the crisis were felt in most emerging markets, even those outside the region, and reached mature markets when, for instance, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management nearly collapsed. In face of these enormous costs, this paper analyses the possibilities and boundaries of attempts to either reduce the likeliness of respective financial shocks or, when unavoidable, lower the costs of managing these crises. On the ground of the state-of-the-art models of currency crises it is examined which domestic or international factors contributed most to the observed outcome. The guiding question is if either moral hazard considerations, in the form of governmental guarantees and alike, or approaches of multiple equilibria are more suited to serve as an explanation. Moreover, this paper illuminates the significance of the original sin hypothesis which states that emerging markets are constrained when trying to borrow abroad in domestic currency or, even when trying at home, to borrow long-term. Although it is acknowledged that all these factors are valid simultaniously, superior importance in the following parts is given on the multiple equilibria approach.
